Tjark Weber. Published online at the Munich Personal RePEc Archive. MPRA Paper No. 17836, available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17836/, October 2009.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. It states that every voting scheme with at least 3 possible outcomes is dictatorial or manipulable. Later work on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem frequently does not distinguish between alternatives and outcomes, thereby leading to a less general statement that requires the voting scheme to be onto. We show how the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be derived from the seemingly less general formulation.
@misc{weber09alternatives,
author = {Tjark Weber},
title = {Alternatives vs.\ Outcomes: A Note on the {Gibbard}-{Satterthwaite} Theorem},
howpublished = {Published online at the Munich Personal RePEc Archive. MPRA Paper No.\ 17836, available at \url{http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17836/}},
month = oct,
year = 2009
}